Lt Col Phil M. "Goldie" Haun (BS, Harvard University; MA, Vanderbilt University) is from Cecilia, Kentucky, a weapons school graduate, and had A-10 assignments in England, Korea, Germany, and Alaska. Colonel Haun attended ACSC and SAASS and is curently serving as the operational officer of the 355th Fighter Squadron (FS) at Eielson AFB, Alaska.Col Christopher E. "Kimos" Haave (USAFA) commanded 81st FS "Panthers" during Operation Allied Force (OAF) and is currently the commander of the 612th Air Operations Group at Davis-Monthan AFB, New Mexico. Kimos had A-10 assignments in England and Germany and flew AT-38s in New Mexico. Colonel Haave is Olmsted Scholar and a graduate of the French Joint Defense College.There are certain dates in the history of warfare that mark real turning points…. Now there is a new date on the calendar: June 3, 1999, when the capitulation of President Milosevic proved that a war can be won by airpower alone.—John Keegan, London's Daily TelegraphColonels Haave and Haun organized the firsthand accounts of members of the 40th Expeditionary Operations Group into this book. Their descriptions of the application of airpower—a new wingman's first combat sortie, a support officer's view of an FS relocation during combat, and Sandy pilot's efforts to find and rescue a downed F-177 pilot—provide the reader with a legitimate insight into an air war at the tactical level and the airpower that helped convice Milosevic to capitulate.DisclaimerOpinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the editors and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.
Биографии и Мемуары / История18+A-10s OVER KOSOVO
The Victory of Airpower over a Fielded Army as Told by the Airmen Who Fought in Operation Allied Force
CHRISTOPHER E. HAAVE, Colonel, USAF
and
PHIL M. HAUN, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
We owe much of our combat success to many outstanding folks who were not present at either Aviano AB or Gioia del Colle AB. Those folks include families and friends who supported us from afar, leaders and commanders who placed faith in our abilities, fellow warriors who shared the danger in the air, dedicated professionals at home bases who provided the logistical lifeblood, and all the past and present members of the A-10 and Air Force communities who trained us right. All these loved ones and colleagues deserve the lion’s share of credit for the A-10 achievements during Allied Force.
In the spring of 1999, NATO engaged in a precedent-setting air campaign over Serbia and Kosovo known as Operation Allied Force (OAF). This event marked a milestone for airpower, as it was, arguably, the first time airpower alone was decisive in achieving victory in combat. By the end of the conflict, in June 1999, America and its allies had mounted a monumental effort to achieve the immediate goals of halting ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and providing for the return of hundreds of thousands of refugees. Ground forces, introduced following the end of the air campaign, have subsequently been employed to secure the peace.
Several books have already been written about OAF, though not as many as might have been expected given the implications for NATO and airpower that came out of that conflict. Those that have been written focus primarily on the strategic level, the events, diplomacy, and decisions by senior military and political leaders that led to the conflict and determined its conduct. This is not that kind of book. This is about the other end of the spectrum as told by those that flew and fought at the most basic level during the war—the A-10 pilots of the 40th Expeditionary Operations Group (EOG).
I was privileged to command the 52d Air Expeditionary Wing during OAF. The 40th EOG was one of four such groups in my wing. Its members’ job was to find and destroy fielded Serb forces in Kosovo and to provide combat search and rescue for downed allied aircrews. This is their story. They take you into the cockpit where you learn how the strategic policy was ultimately put into action.
After the war, one senior Air Force officer said, “About 80 percent of the airpower effort was magnificent, but the other 20 percent was pretty ugly.” Through the eyes of the 40th EOG, you’ll see the good, the bad, and the ugly. You will appreciate the enormous pressures placed on our fighter pilots as they strove to find and verify valid military targets, protect the civilian population against collateral damage, destroy fielded Serbian forces, and rescue downed airmen. You’ll appreciate how well and how professionally they carried out their mission, and you will experience the frustration that comes from waging war within the inevitable restrictions placed by our leaders.
OAF was an unusual war in many ways. Indeed, due to allied political sensitivities, we didn’t even call it a “war” for quite some time. Gen Wesley K. Clark, supreme allied commander in Europe termed it